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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260726T073824Z
UID:Seminar-dept-1046@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20230606T160000
DTEND:20230606T170000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Krzysztof Apt: Characterization of Incentive Compatible Single-parameter Mechanisms Revisited\n\nWe review the characterization of incentive compatible\n\nsingle-parameter mechanisms introduced by Archer and Tardos in 2001.\n\nWe argue that the claimed (and often cited) uniqueness result has not\n\nbeen established in the computer science literature and clarify that\n\nit was given in a slightly different setting in the 2002 Krishna's\n\nbook `Auction Theory'. However, this proof implicitly relies on\n\nLebesgue integral.\n\n\n\nWe provide an elementary proof of uniqueness that unifies the\n\npresentation for two classes of allocation functions considered in the\n\n2016 book of Rougharden `Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory'\n\nand show that the general case is a consequence of a little known\n\nresult from the theory of real functions.\n\n\n\nThe corresponding general result and its modification to more\n\ndimensions yield elementary proofs of characterizations of incentive\n\ncompatibility for Bayesian mechanisms and dominant mechanisms studied\n\nin 2015 Boerger's book `An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism\n\nDesign', and multiunit auctions and combinatorial auctions considered\n\nin Krishna's book.  (Such results are called Revenue Equivalence in\n\nthe economics literature.)\n\n\n\nJoint work with Jan Heering.  The talk is based on a paper that\n\nrecently appeared in\n\nthe Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, see\n\nhttp://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v007-1/v007-1-4.html.\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=1046
LOCATION:Electrical Engineering, Lecture Theatre
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