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PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260915T080659Z
UID:Seminar-dept-1235@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20240424T150000
DTEND:20240424T160000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Maria Polukarov: Strategic Voting and Candidacy\n\nModern societies often need to make choices based on the desires and preferences of multiple stakeholders: such choices range from traffic policies in a local neighbourhood to joining or leaving major political or economic alliances. Similar challenges are faced by many organisations, both commercial and non-profit: examples include hiring decisions, identifying strategic priorities, and budget allocation. Likewise, independent artificial agents interacting in a common environment may need to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources. In such contexts, voting protocols represent a central tool for collective decision-making. \n\n\n\nWe analyse voting scenarios from a game-theoretic perspective, viewing strategic parties as players and examining possible stable outcomes of their interaction (e.g., equilibria), both from a normative and from a computational perspective. Specifically, we model strategic behaviours by voters or candidates as voting (respectively, candidacy) games and study the existence and properties of stable game solutions, as well as their reachability by natural iterative processes, such as best-response dynamics or its restricted variants. \n\n\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=1235
LOCATION:6th Floor Conference Room 605, EEE
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