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PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260916T035837Z
UID:Seminar-dept-278@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20120221T160000
DTEND:20120221T170000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Bernhard von Stengel: Nash Codes for Noisy Channels\n\nWe consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of nature to signals. The receiver's best response is to decode the received channel output as the state with highest expected receiver payoff.  Given this decoding, an equilibrium or ``Nash code'' results if the sender encodes every state as prescribed.  \n\nWe show two theorems that give sufficient conditions for Nash codes.  First, a receiver-optimal code defines a Nash code. A second, more surprising observation holds for communication over a binary channel which is used independently a number of times, a basic model of information transmission: Under a minimal ``monotonicity'' requirement for breaking ties when decoding, which holds generically, ANY code is a Nash code.\n\n\n\n(Joint work with P. Hernandez)\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=278
LOCATION:G12
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