BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260920T104159Z
UID:Seminar-dept-290@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20120530T160000
DTEND:20120530T170000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Prof. R. Ramanujam: Individual rationality and societal rationality\n\nWe study a game model to highlight the mutual recursiveness of individual\n\nrationality and societal rationality. These are games that change\n\nintrinsically based on the actions / strategies played by the players.\n\nThere is an implicit player - the society, who makes actions available to\n\nplayers and incurs certain costs in doing so.  If and when it feels that\n\nan action $a$ is being played by a small number of players and/or it\n\nbecomes too expensive for it to maintain the action 'a', it removes 'a'\n\nfrom the set of available actions. This results in a change in the game\n\nand the players strategise afresh taking this change into account.\n\n\n\nWe study the question: which actions of the players should the society\n\nrestrict and how should it restrict them so that the social cost is\n\nminimised in the eventuality? Conversely, given rules by which society\n\nrestricts, how should players strategise to achieve given objectives ?\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=290
LOCATION:G12
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR