BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260410T034929Z
UID:Seminar-dept-334@lxserverA.csc.liv.ac.uk.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20131112T160000
DTEND:20131112T170000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Dr. David Sarne: The Devastating Effect of Information Brokers in Multi-Agent Systems\n\nIn many multi-agent systems we find information brokers - agents that can\n\ndisambiguate noisy signals upon payment of a fee (e.g., Carfax that provides\n\nreports on car histories, credit report companies, experts that provide\n\naccurate estimates on auctioned items). In this talk I will show that better\n\ninformation can hurt: the presence of the expert, even if the use of her\n\nservices is optional, can degrade both individual agents' utilities and\n\noverall social welfare.\n\nThe talk will focus on information brokers in two specific domains: auctions\n\n(where the provided information relates to the common value of the auctioned\n\nitem) and distributed agent matching. For the first, I'll show that with the\n\nexistence of the information provider, in conflict with classic auction\n\ntheory, the auctioneer will not necessarily find it beneficial to have more\n\nbidders participate in the auction and similarly bidders will not\n\nnecessarily prefer less competition. Also, bidders' unawareness of the\n\nauctioneer's option to purchase the information does not necessarily play\n\ninto the hands of the auctioneer and, similarly, bidders may sometimes\n\nbenefit from not knowing that the auctioneer has the option to purchase such\n\ninformation. For the distributed matching application I'll show that the\n\nexternality imposed by the fact that others are consulting the expert can\n\nlead to a situation where the equilibrium outcome is that everyone consults\n\nthe expert, even though all agents would be better off if the expert were\n\nnot present. In both cases the agents may find it beneficial to pay the\n\ninformation-provider in order to leave the market (or alternatively publicly\n\nincrease the price of the information she offers).\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=334
LOCATION:Ashton Lecture Theater
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR