BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260408T223445Z
UID:Seminar-dept-352@lxserverA.csc.liv.ac.uk.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20140603T160000
DTEND:20140603T170000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Krzysztof Apt: Selfishness Level of Strategic Games\n\nWe introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be offered to each player to achieve that a social optimum is realized in a pure Nash equilibrium. The selfishness level is unrelated to the price of stability and the price of anarchy.\n\n\n\nWe study the selfishness level of several well-known strategic games. This allows us to quantify the implicit tension within a game between players' individual interests and the impact of their decisions on the society as a whole. Our analyses reveal that the selfishness level often provides a deeper understanding of the characteristics of the underlying game that influence the players' willingness to cooperate.\n\n\n\nFor instance, the selfishness level of the n-players Prisoner's Dilemma is c/(b(n-1)-c), where b and c are the benefit and cost for cooperation, respectively, and that of the n-players public goods game is (1-cn)/(c-1), where c is the public good multiplier. In turn, the selfishness level of Cournot competition, Tragedy of the Commons, and Bertrand competition is infinite.\n\n\n\nThis is a joint work with Guido Schaefer. The paper appeared in the last issue of JAIR, see http://www.jair.org/papers/paper4164.html .\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=352
LOCATION:Ashton Lecture Theater
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR