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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260412T101425Z
UID:Seminar-dept-479@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20191105T130000
DTEND:20191105T140000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Bo Chen: Capacity Auctions: VCG Mechanism vs. Submodularity\n\nUsing energy supply as an example, we study a form of capacity mechanism that combines capacity and supply auctions. We characterize how participants bid in this auction and show that, on a pay-as-bid basis, an equilibrium behaviour gives Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) profits and achieves efficient outcomes when there is submodularity, which is in stark contrast with what in the existing literature — at equilibrium VCG payments achieve truthful bids and efficiency. We also provide some necessary and sufficient conditions for submodularity.\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=479
LOCATION:Ashton Lecture Theater
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