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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260911T052327Z
UID:Seminar-EcCo-598@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Nicos 	Protopapas:MAILTO:N.Protopapas@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20190327T130000
DTEND:20190327T140000
SUMMARY:Economics and Computation Series
DESCRIPTION:Giorgos Christodoulou: On the Nisan-Ronen conjecture for submodular valuations\n\nWe will discuss the Nisan-Ronen conjecture, which was posed in the seminal paper by Nisan and Ronen in the ’99 paper that originated Algorithmic Mechanism Design. The conjecture has to do with the approximation ratio that can be achieved by truthful mechanisms for makespan minimization on scheduling unrelated machines. The conjecture, arguably the most important open problem in algorithmic mechanism design, states that the approximation ratio is n when the valuation of all machines are additive. We will give an overview of the area and present recent progress for submodular domains.\n\nThis is joint work with Elias Koutsoupias (U Oxford) and Annamaria Kovacs (U Frankfurt).\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=598
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