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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260917T131304Z
UID:Seminar-EcCo-607@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Nicos 	Protopapas:MAILTO:N.Protopapas@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20190626T130000
DTEND:20190626T140000
SUMMARY:Economics and Computation Series
DESCRIPTION:Victor Verdugo Silva: Prophets and Optimal Auctions\n\nIn many situations finding the optimal revenue pricing policy requires to solve a hard optimisation problem. Posted price mechanism are simple and efficiently implementable. In this talk I'll show the connection between this type of mechanisms and optimal stopping rules for online selection problems, and how the guarantees from one problem to the other are preserved.\n\nJoint work with José Correa, Patricio Foncea and Dana Pizarro.\nAppeared in Operations Research Letters 2019.\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=607
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