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PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260921T051505Z
UID:Seminar-EcCo-995@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Nicos 	Protopapas:MAILTO:N.Protopapas@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20210421T130000
DTEND:20210421T140000
SUMMARY:Economics and Computation Series
DESCRIPTION:Estelle Varloot: Level-strategyproof belief aggregation mechanisms\n\nWhen aggregating experts probabilistic predictions over an aligned set of outcomes $\Lambda$ (that we model as a Borel measurable subset of the real line $\mathbf{R}$), we introduce level-strategyproofness and prove that it is not only natural but also robust as it implies strategyproofness for a rich domain of single-peakedness preferences on the space of cumulative distributions. Our main results are: (1) the characterization of level-strategyproof probability aggregation mechanisms with or without the combination with other axioms; (2) the determination of four impossibility results when certain axioms are combined or reinforced; and (3) the axiomatization of two new and potentially practical level-strategyproof methods: the middlemost-cumulative and the proportional-cumulative. They are compared with other methods and the proportional-cumulative is applied to extend the approval voting, majority rule, and the more recent majority judgment to situations where voters are uncertain about the quality of the candidates/alternatives to be ranked. \n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=995
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