To explore, from a game-theoretic point of view, models which have been used to understand phenomena in which conflict and cooperation occur. To see the relevance of the theory not only to parlour games but also to situations involving human relationships, economic bargaining (between trade union and employer, etc), threats, formation of coalitions, war, etc. To treat fully a number of specific games including the famous examples of "The Prisoners' Dilemma" and "The Battle of the Sexes". To treat in detail two-person zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. To give a brief review of n-person games. In microeconomics, to look at exchanges in the absence of money, i.e. bartering, in which two individuals or two groups are involved.To see how the Prisoner's Dilemma arises in the context of public goods.

(LO1) Apply mathematical methods in modelling in Economics and the Social Sciences.

(LO2) Formulate situations of conflict and cooperation in game-theoretic terms.

(LO3) Solve mathematically a variety of standard problems in the theory of games.

(LO4) Evaluate the relevance of mathematical solutions of standard problems in the theory of games in real-life situations.

Material is presented during lectures (3 hours per week). Tutorials (1 hour per week) are used for consolidation and practice, and for help with individual questions.

Simple examples of games. Von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of utility.

Concepts:  Conflict and cooperation; game-trees, normal and extensive form; domination, Nash equilibrium..

Two-player, zero-sum games:  statement of maximin theorem and its consequences;  solution (2 x 2, 2 x 3, 3 x 3).

Two-player, non-zero-sum, non-cooperative games: solution concepts and implication for Prisoners' Dilemma.

Two-player cooperative games:  Bargaining and threat concepts..

N-player cooperative games: coalitions, characteristic function, imputations and the core.

Microeconomic theory. Edgeworth Box, public goods.