Endogenous Boolean Games

26^th November 2013, 16:00 Ashton Lecture Theater
Dr. Paolo Turrini
Department of Computing
Imperial College London

Abstract

In boolean games players exercise control over propositional variables and strive to achieve a goal formula whose realization might require the op- ponents’ cooperation. Recently, a theory of incentive engineering for such games has been de vised, where an external authority steers the out- come of the game towards certain desirable prop- erties consistent with players’ goals, by imposing a taxation mechanism on the players that makes the outcomes that do not comply with those properties less appealing to them. The present contribution stems from a complementary perspective and studies, instead, how boolean games can be transformed from inside, rather than from outside, by endowing players with the possibility of sacrificing a part of their payoff received at a certain outcome in order to convince other players to play a certain strategy. What we call here endogenous boolean games (EBGs) boils down to enriching the framework of boolean games with the machinery of side payments coming from game theory. We analyze equilibria in EBGs, showing the preconditions needed for desirable outcomes to be achieved without external intervention. Finally, making use of taxation mechanism, we show how to transform an EBG in such a way that desirable outcomes can be realized independently of side payments.